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Abstract 
This paper explores the UK government‟s approach to combating social 
exclusion since 1997.  It considers the philosophy and political economy 
underpinning New Labour policy, and explains the economic and social policy 
prescriptions that follow from these principles.  The government‟s social 
exclusion agenda has provoked a wide range of controversies and debates in 
the academic and political communities.  In addition to putting a perspective 
on the government‟s political economy of social exclusion, the purpose of this 
paper is to explore key debates.  The story of New Labour‟s political economy 
of social exclusion therefore pauses at key junctures to discuss eight 
controversies and dilemmas representing a range of critical responses to third 
way thinking about social inclusion.  It is concluded that New Labour‟s 
approach to social exclusion is contractarian, offering conditional access to 
the mainstream to outsiders.  The individual pledges to take responsibility 
across the full spectrum of social life, from enhancing her employability to 
maintaining a healthy life style.  The state is re-shaped to bear part of the risk 
that such responsible individuals face, but in ways that minimise dependency 
and the social wage. 
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Introduction 
There are a myriad debates about the concepts of social exclusion/inclusion.  
They range from philosophical questions about whether social exclusion is an 
appropriate concept for policy makers and scholars to policy questions about 
what kind of interventions might bring about social inclusion and whether 
social exclusion is reducing or increasing, which itself depends on the 
definition employed (see Levitas, 1998; Askonas, 2000; Hills et al, 2002).   
 
This paper unpacks these debates as they pertain to the philosophy and 
practice of New Labour.  First, it looks at how the idea of „social exclusion‟ 
emerged in Europe and the UK.  It then considers New Labour‟s political 
economy of social exclusion.  This discussion examines the free market 
premise of Labour policy and its goals for „inclusion‟ – creating equality of 
opportunity and active citizenship.  The analysis is supported with several 
empirical examples which illustrate how the government‟s approach is 
implemented at the local scale.   
 
The analysis of New Labour‟s approach to social exclusion pauses to discuss 
eight controversies and dilemmas which flow from the argument.  Is the term 
„social exclusion‟ useful?  Who is excluded?  Does exclusion matter?  Are 
individualism and communitarianism compatible in the New Labour schema?  
Is human capital really instrumental to inclusion?  Can public services be 
marketised without making inequality worse?  Can one-nation consensual 
politics really be institutionalised in urban governance?  And can the 
government overcome economic instability and ameliorate income 
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inequalities?  The conclusion is that while the government has a sophisticated 
approach to social inclusion, it remains unproven and is unsurprisingly 
vulnerable to powerful normative and empirical disputation.   
 
The origins of the ‘Social Exclusion’ Discourse 
The term social exclusion seems to have been coined by Renee Lenoir, 
French Secretary of State for Social Welfare during the 1970s (Lenoir, 1974; 
Pierce, 1999).  Lenoir found that one French person in ten was an exclu, or an 
„outcast‟.  This group of people ranged from the physically and mentally 
disabled to „socially maladjusted‟ people whose conditions produced mental 
illness, suicide, drug/alcohol abuse and „anti-social behaviour‟ (Pierce, 1999: 
1).  The novel characteristic of les exclus was not that they were poor 
(although most were), but that they were disconnected from mainstream 
society in ways that went beyond poverty – for example non-participation in 
politics, poor health and geographical isolation.  Lenoir attributed social 
exclusion to the dislocating effects of the rapid post-war transition from 
agrarian to urban society in France.  These events led to poverty, he argued, 
but also to social polarisation to an extent which challenged the ideals of the 
French Republican project – Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite.  Lenoir‟s solution 
resonated with the traditional social democratic remedies of the time, but with 
a twist.  He argued for increased public investment and redistribution, but also 
for empowerment through civil and democratic renewal, measures to re-
engage les exclus with the mainstream.  Seen this way social exclusion in 
France had powerful structural drivers but could be remedied with a suitable 
policy response.   
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„Social exclusion‟ became part of the British policy lexicon in the summer of 
1997, when Peter Mandelson announced the government‟s intention to set up 
a Social Exclusion Unit (Levitas, 1999).  The government‟s narrative on the 
causes of social exclusion blamed three principal factors: the dislocation 
caused by industrial retrenchment in the 1980s, necessary as that may have 
been in a globalising economy; the catastrophic indifference of the Thatcher 
and Major governments to the social effects of retrenchment; and the 
consequent failure of the welfare system to address properly the social and 
economic ills of those displaced by the decimation of the coal, steel, fishing 
and motor industries (Giddens, 1998).    
 
For Mandelson, to be socially excluded is to be part of an underclass, lacking 
the means to participate in economic, social, cultural and political life.  New 
Labour‟s exclus constitute a substantial minority of the UK population – for 
Blair the „3 million people living in the worst 1300 housing estates 
experiencing rising poverty, unemployment, educational failure and crime‟ 
(cited in Levitas, 1999).  The significance of this depiction for Labour politics 
was that it heralded a departure from the traditional concern with income 
redistribution and a move toward concern with a broader spectrum of social 
problems.   
 
The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) was set up in December 1997.  Its remit is 
primarily to coordinate policy interventions across government departments, 
between statutory and other agencies and to produce „joined-up‟ solutions to 
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complex problems.  The Government defines social exclusion thus (ODPM, 
2004: 3):  
 
Social exclusion is about more than income poverty. It is a shorthand 
term for what can happen when people or areas face a combination of 
linked problems such as unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low 
incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown. 
These problems are linked and mutually reinforcing so that they can 
create a vicious cycle in people‟s lives. 
 
Here, we hit immediately upon three substantial controversies in the literature 
about social exclusion: Is it a useful concept?  Who is excluded?  And does 
exclusion matter?  I explore each controversy in turn.   
 
Controversy 1: Is Social Exclusion a useful Concept?   
„Social exclusion‟, as Mandelson indicated, is closely related to underclass 
theories through the idea that a group of people has become marooned from 
mainstream society.  There are many underclass theories, but it has been 
argued that New Labour‟s approach resonates to some extent with the moral 
underclass discourse (MUD) (Levitas, 1998) associated with the work of 
Charles Murray (Murray, 1990).  MUD is akin to the Victorian notion of the 
„residuum‟ – a pauper class characterised by moral degeneracy, sloth and 
general turpitude. In this version of underclass theory, the excluded have only 
themselves to blame.   
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Arguably, to reject underclass theory altogether is to reject the very idea of 
„social exclusion‟.  In Marxist theories, for example, capitalism is inherently 
dysfunctional for the inclusive society in three ways: it is intrinsically unstable - 
prone to booms and slumps; it is intrinsically antagonistic, the competitive 
dynamic producing a struggle over ownership and control of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange; and it is intrinsically inegalitarian, the 
competitive struggle producing big winners and big losers.  Byrne (1999) 
argues, therefore, that far from being an underclass the „excluded‟ are a 
reserve army of Labour, continually moving in and out of employment at the 
bottom end of the labour market, mobilised or de-mobilised depending on 
fluctuations in the economy.  In this perspective, „exclusion‟ from the 
mainstream is rarely permanent and long term unemployment varies from 
generation to generation, sometimes shrinking to nothing. But it has no 
sustainable remedy within a mode of production that can only reproduce it.   
 
There are supporting data to this point of view.  According to the Office for 
National Statistics, 323,000 people were „long term‟ unemployed in the UK in 
spring 2003 (ie for more than 12 months) (Begum, 2004).  Moreover, long 
term unemployment has fallen sharply since 1993 at a faster rate than both 
short term (<6 months) and medium term (<6, >12 months) unemployment.  
Short term unemployment has risen steeply as a proportion of the 
unemployed population (ONS, April 2004).  Overall unemployment has fallen 
consistently over the past decade and is presently at a 30 year low - a little 
more or a little less than one million depending on measurement.   
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Again, this data calls into question the image of an underclass marooned from 
society.  Of course, falling unemployment is not a bad thing and the 
government demands a lot of credit for it.  The Marxist argument is that it has 
little to do with government policy and much to do with the routine fluctuations 
of capitalism.  The question, then, is whether it is meaningful to describe a 
presently small and constantly fluctuating number of people as a class of any 
kind, let alone an underclass.   Isn‟t it better, says Byrne to see people who 
move up and down the lowest rungs of society from generation to generation 
as part of the regular working class? 
 
Clearly, this perspective has profound policy implications.  Instead of focusing 
on an underclass marooned from the mainstream, it demands either a 
comprehensive transformation from capitalism to socialism (not a matter for 
policy makers as such), or a radical and unconditional redistribution of 
resources to those who suffer the inevitable consequences of life under 
capitalism – the goal of left wing social democrats like Tony Benn.    
 
This debate about whether the term provides a valid organising framework for 
public policy has a more concrete manifestation.  In identifying a long list of 
social problems associated with exclusion, it is argued that the government 
makes no attempt to talk about the relationship between them.  Critics have 
accused New Labour of using this listing approach to evade the centrality of 
income poverty to other problems like health, crime and educational 
attainment – whereas the left would look for relationships and explanations 
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(Fairclough, 2000: 28).  The relationship between income and educational 
attainment illustrates.  According to a Treasury report, if one father‟s earnings 
are double another, his son‟s math test score is an average 5 percentile 
points higher and his reading score 2.7 percentile points higher.  For a 
daughter, the gain is 5% for both reading and math (cited in Callinicos, 2001: 
51).  The question, then, is if we agree that policy should focus on  multiple 
forms of deprivation, how we decide which factors affect which other factors 
and which are the most importance?  At issue is whether the official definition 
of social exclusion evades relationships and causes to disguise New Labour‟s 
rejection of traditional socialist egalitarian concerns. 
 
Controversy 2: Who is socially excluded?  Who is to blame?   
Levitas (1998) identifies three primary social exclusion discourses.  The 
redistributionist perspective associated with left wing social democracy is 
known as RED.  In this view, social exclusion is caused by the workings of 
capitalist economies and therefore les exclus cannot be held to blame for their 
predicament.  They are expelled rather than excluded.  The moral underclass 
discourse (MUD) has been discussed above. The social integration discourse 
(SID) concerns itself with reengaging the excluded with the mainstream, 
primarily through market opportunities.  While structural forces such as 
economic globalisation (and past governments) may have caused exclusion, it 
is possible to redeem the excluded, given a judicious policy mix and individual 
enlightenment about personal responsibility.  Levitas sees Labour having 
migrated from RED to a combination of SID and MUD – the third way doctrine 
of responsibilities as the condition of rights (Giddens, 1998; 2001).  The 
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correct policy response to exclusion (if the term is held to be useful) therefore 
depends on whether it is caused by social breakdown, the moral turpitude of 
the excluded themselves, or the predictable workings of a market-based class 
society (Byrne, 1999). 
 
Another difficult issue is how wide, in policy terms, to cast the net in defining 
exclusion, however it is caused.  As noted above, Blair applied the label to 3 
million people.  Others however, characterise the fundamental socioeconomic 
cleavages in society differently.  Writing about Thatcherism, Jessop et al 
(1988) argued that Tory electoral success under Thatcher depended on a „two 
nations' political project, a divisive strategy designed to reward the „productive' 
while marginalizing „parasitic' members of society – creating a north/south 
geopolitical divide.  Cut another way, however, we have a 'two thirds-one 
third‟ society in which two thirds enjoy prosperity and security while the 
remaining third suffer economic deprivation, insecurity and anxiety.  Another 
cut is a „one quarter - three quarters‟ society, where the majority suffer from 
some form of economic insecurity or anxiety and the future remains to some 
degree uncertain.  For example, the Breadline Britain survey carried out by 
London Weekend Television in 1990 found that 21 million adults felt they 
lacked at least one of the necessities which make life worth living - hobbies, a 
holiday, the occasional celebration - on account of the expense (cited in Cox, 
1995).   
 
Macdonald and Marsh (2001: 387) therefore argue that „unemployment, job 
insecurity and poor work have become common working-class experiences, 
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rather than the preserve of an underclass positioned beneath them‟.  In other 
words, the socioeconomic problems identified in the term „social exclusion‟ 
are, in fact, mainstream and not confined to a minority, however narrowly or 
widely it is drawn.  The target group for policies to address social exclusion 
therefore depends on the cut – which socioeconomic cleavages are 
considered important and what is held to have caused them.   
 
Controversy 3 – Is Social Exclusion Necessarily Bad? 
Thirdly, it must be asked whether „social exclusion‟ is necessarily a problem.  
For philosophers of the libertarian right, such as Hayek (1944), market 
outcomes are inviolable and represent a proxy for social justice – equalities of 
opportunity and outcome are of no concern.  In this view, social exclusion 
need not trouble government, whose duty is to maintain the minimal state to 
enforce a level playing field in market competition.   
 
A second view, from the radical left, is that we should break the link between 
the right to an income and the obligation to earn or use it in ways consistent 
with the economic and cultural hegemony of capitalism (Bowring, 2000: 307).  
Bowring argues that Levitas (1998) and like-minded redistributionist scholars 
implicitly equate exclusion with normative deviation and inclusion with 
conformity to social convention.  He argues that the RED brigade must be 
prepared to break with and risk the disapproval of the guardians of social 
normality and assert the existence of new needs, which cannot be satisfied by 
capitalism (2000: 309).   Bowring goes on to argue that assuming people are 
ashamed of poverty is a „scandalous attribution to make‟ – noting that many 
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statistically poor people are reluctant to describe themselves as such (see 
also Richardson and Le Grand, 2002).  The normative tendency to define 
deprivation in terms of exclusion, he continues, precludes the possibility of 
meeting needs in unconventional ways and reformulating „need‟ itself in ways 
that loosen the grip of social expectation (2000: 315).  Bowring concludes that 
the „assertion of the autonomous subject “is always the antithesis of 
socialization, of adaptation to a role or status”.  “it is the gesture of refusal, of 
resistance, that creates the subject … It is the more restricted ability to stand 
aside from our own social role, our non-belonging and our need to protest that 
allows each of us to live as a subject”‟ (Touraine, cited in Bowring, 2000: 317).   
 
Bowring‟s strategy for political resistance to capital, its norms and values and 
to the way it stigmatises and „shames‟ those who deviate from them is not 
directed at policy makers.  However, it offers an implicit challenge to policy 
makers to engage with target groups to find out what they mean by social 
inclusion and exclusion (see Richardson and Le Grand, 2002) and it begs the 
question of whether the government should label people without their consent.  
I now turn to the political thinking which underpins the government‟s 
characterisation of socio-economic injustice and its proposed remedies.  
 
New Labour, Political Economy and Social Inclusion 
New Labour‟s political economy is the subject of great controversy, not easily 
separable from the debate about social exclusion.  The debate is, essentially, 
about whether it is still a party of the left (see Giddens, 1998; Hay, 1999; 
Fairclough, 2000; Callinicos, 2001).  This paper does not address that 
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question directly, but highlights issues pertinent to it through the discussion of 
social exclusion.   
 
It is arguable that whatever position one holds on the present government‟s 
leftist credentials, it demonstrates considerable coherence in its basic 
economic principles (Coates and Hay, 2001: 469).  Whatever else the 
government seeks to do in the realm of progressive politics, it must be done in 
the context of a free market economy.  According to Blair, ‘the best way to 
promote efficiency in production is through competition, liberalization and 
open markets – not through monopoly, state subsidy or preferential 
procurement‟ (cited in Coates and Hay, 2001: 454).   
 
For Hay (1999), Fairclough (2000), Callinicos (2001) and others, in taking this 
position the Government has cast capitalist globalisation as a non-negotiable 
constraint on any progressive agenda.  Hay argues that it has restricted the 
„possible, the feasible and the desirable to that imaginable within the 
ascendant neo-liberal world view‟ (1999: 11).  Or, as Alan Milburn put it, 
capturing the zeitgeist of New Labour politics: „[t]he old Soviet empire has 
fallen.  Capitalism has triumphed‟ (10.11.03).  From the collapse of the Soviet 
bloc it is inferred that class politics are obsolete.  As Giddens puts it „as a 
system of economic management, socialism is no more‟ (1998: 3).    
 
The global capitalist renaissance triggered by the fall of the Soviet Bloc 
(Marquand, 2004) has meant two things for New Labour.  First, any 
progressive or re-distributive strategy depends on the tax-take generated in a 
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dynamic, competitive, free market economy.  Second, success in this 
endeavour requires national unity.  Running through the government‟s political 
strategy is a „one nation‟ political vision.  Says Blair:    
 
The creation of an economy where we are inventing and producing 
goods and services of quality needs the engagement of the whole 
country.  It must be a matter of national purpose and national pride … 
One-nation politics is not some expression of sentiment, or even of 
justifiable concern for the less well off.  It is an active politics – the 
bringing of the country together, a sharing of the possibility of power, 
wealth and opportunity (cited in Fairclough, 2000: 87).   
 
Furthermore, argues Blair, „competing on quality can‟t be done by 
Government alone. The whole nation must put its shoulder to the wheel‟ (cited 
in Fairclough, 2000: 28).  He even asserts that „New Labour is the political 
arm of none other than the British people as a whole.  Our values are the 
same‟ (cited in Fairclough, 2000: 47).  For Blair, then, the dynamic free-
market economy must be embedded in a strong nation where conflict, though 
far from trivial, is over-determined by a common value base.  In this vein, 
Patricia Hewitt sees the task of 21st century social democracy being to 
„reconcile apparently irreconcilable interests‟ (2003: 335) while, for John 
Prescott „economic prosperity and social justice are two sides of the same 
coin‟ (30.9.2004).  Fairclough describes this approach as New Labour‟s 
„rhetoric of reconciliation‟ (2000: viii).  Davies (forthcoming, 2006) concludes 
that while the government is evidently not afraid of confrontation, be it political 
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or military, consensus is its preferred discursive and political style – at least 
on the domestic front. The government‟s philosophies of community and 
active citizenship are crucial mechanisms for animating this one-nation, 
consensual political vision.   
 
Social Inclusion as Active Citizenship  
In a pamphlet written shortly after he became Prime Minister, Blair wrote 'we 
all depend on collective goods for our independence; and all our lives are 
enriched - or impoverished - by the communities to which we belong'. He 
continued: 'A key challenge of progressive politics is to use the state as an 
enabling force, protecting effective communities and voluntary organisations 
and encouraging their growth to tackle new needs, in partnership as 
appropriate' (Blair, 1998: 4).  Perhaps the most familiar slogan in the New 
Labour repertoire derives from Etzioni's assertion that rights entail 
responsibilities (1993: 144ff). Against the politics of unconditional entitlement, 
this approach burdens the individual with primary responsibility for her own 
fate (1993: 145).   
 
On its own, of course, proclaiming that responsibility is the condition for rights 
is trivial for „rights are grounds of duties in others‟ (Raz, cited in Callinicos, 
2001: 60).  Community enters the equation as a collective form of self-help.  
For New Labour, a culture change within the citizenry is necessary to valorise 
its one nation project and inculcate communitarian values (Landrum 2002: 
222).  The following statement appears on the Home Office Active 
Communities website ref: 
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The Government's vision for active communities is of strong, active and 
empowered communities - increasingly capable of doing things for 
themselves, defining the problems they face and then tackling them 
together. It is a vision in which everyone - no matter their age, race or 
social background - has a sense of belonging and a stake in society. 
 
Labour Party Chairman Ian McCartney describes active citizenship, thus 
understood, as the condition of civil and political rights and social and 
economic advancement (McCartney, 2003: 324).  For David Blunkett (9.3.04), 
active citizenship links to the exercise of social responsibility by individual and 
community.  He too sees it as the very condition of political freedom (Blunkett, 
September 2003: 1-3).   
 
The New Labour project is charged with replacing lost traditions with forms of 
solidarity compatible with the dynamic capacities of the global free market 
economy.  The Government‟s aim is to build „strong, empowered and active 
communities in which people increasingly do things for themselves and the 
state acts to facilitate, support and enable citizens to lead self-determined, 
fulfilled lives for the common good‟ (Home Office, 2003: 6).  In this 
interpretation, community is a support network to help individuals cope with 
social and economic change and reduce fear of it.  For Blunkett, „only by 
engaging and developing citizens … will there be hope of achieving ambitions 
for a robust, knowledge-driven economy, for vibrant, self-sustaining 
communities and for a universal culture of lifelong learning‟ (Home Office, 
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December 2003: 11).   Active citizenship is therefore a renewal mechanism; a 
conduit to economic competitiveness, national prosperity and social inclusion 
in a global arena where free markets are inviolable and we must all, 
particularly those of us reliant on the state, bear an increasing share of the 
risk they entail.   
 
What, then, is the glue to community in New Labour politics?  Arguably, it is a 
conception of solidarity as an ethical obligation.  The individual is responsible 
for her own security, but in a risk-intensive society she is also responsible for 
others in her family, street, estate or neighbourhood in the event that they fall 
on hard times.  This notion of solidarity relies not on socialist notions of class 
having objective material and political interests defined by its relation to 
capital, but on a doctrine of obligation to others, founded in the one nation 
vision outlined above and in the realm of ethics.  One practical method by 
which this ethic is encouraged is through the government‟s support for 
„communities of faith‟.  Faith is, of course, its own reward but for Blair, it has 
instrumental value.  Speaking at the Christian Socialist Movement annual 
conference in 2001, he commented:  
 
Equal worth, responsibility, community - these values are fundamental 
to my political creed. They play a large part in faiths represented here 
today. You seek to realise them not just in the practice of your faith, but 
in your community and voluntary activity, extending far beyond the 
confines of your regular congregations. 
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Tony Blair has associated himself and sometimes been associated with the 
tradition of British Idealism, a brand of religious philosophy drawing on 
Hegelian metaphysics founded by T H Green (Carter, 2003).  Matt Carter (an 
Idealist scholar, now General Secretary of the UK Labour Party) argues that 
Idealism presents a way through competing doctrines of individual versus 
society.  It sees the self-realisation of individuals and the development of a 
moral personality as central to the „good society‟.  Individuals should be able 
to appropriate property, because this is best way for both individuals and 
society to flourish (2003: 35).  But this right to acquire wealth does not mean 
that a person can do as she likes with it (2003: 27).  In the idealist tradition, 
we only realise our capacity for personality in society and, through social 
membership, recognise the reciprocal nature of rights and duties.  In response 
to those who argue that there is an inherent tension between individualism 
and communitarianism, Idealism asserts an epistemological unity of individual 
and common good (2003: 23).  Any tension, in this view, is creative and not 
destructive.  
 
The point here is not to argue that the New Labour project is built on religious 
philosophy.  The government is cosmopolitan in its religious beliefs, or lack of 
them.  However, it is possible to derive from this tradition one solution to the 
contradictions between individual and community, competitiveness and 
cohesion within the context of a capitalist economy – goods the left have 
traditionally viewed as irreconcilable.  In New Labour‟s interpretation of the 
relationship between individual and society, it is then possible to identify a 
three-sided contract.  The citizen must be prepared to do two things; take the 
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risks necessary to make the market economy flourish, thereby securing her 
personal security, and engage in civil action through community networks to 
support those who suffer misfortune in doing so.  The State is pledged to 
deliver „equality of opportunity‟, discussed further below.  The fourth 
controversy, however, pertains to credibility of this formulation of the unity of 
individual and community in New Labour politics.   
 
Controversy 4: Individualism versus Communitarianism? 
One of the criticisms of the government‟s approach to social inclusion is that it 
imposes certain norms of conduct on segments of society.  This points to a 
fundamental tension characterised famously in contemporary political 
philosophy as the debate between liberals (John Rawls) and communitarians 
(Alisdair MacIntyre). Arguably, the regeneration of communities is made more 
difficult by the general movement toward free market individualism which New 
Labour sees as inevitable and endorses.  Ideologically, free market 
individualism is atomistic and prioritises individual choice, of which 
communitarians are suspicious. New Labour's enthusiasm for the 
deregulation of labour markets, the need not to be seen as anti-competition, 
anti-business, or anti-markets sit awkwardly with its simultaneous appeal to 
an enhanced, inclusive moral fabric within the community (Callinicos, 2001).   
 
How far, then, does New Labour‟s appeal to the unity of individual and 
community heralded by Idealist thought trump these tensions?  One difficulty 
lies in the difference between Idealist conceptions of the relationship between 
individual and community and those of New Labour.   Blair has, on occasion, 
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claimed to have been influenced by the Idealist philosopher, John Macmurray.  
Sarah Hale, however, finds that Blair‟s philosophy is frequently in „stark 
opposition‟ to Macmurray‟s (2002: 192).  There are „gaping chasms‟, she 
argues on just about every issue that Macmurray held forth (2002: 193). Hale 
demonstrates how, contra Blair, Etzioni and Giddens, Macmurray‟s 
communitarianism condemns instrumentalism.  At the heart of his idea of the 
personal life is a relationship  
 
which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it 
is natural to human beings to share their experience, to understand 
one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together (Macmurray 
cited in Hale, 2002: 193-4).     
 
Macmurray went on to condemn instrumentalism outright.   „The first thing we 
have to stop is the false idea that it is a good thing to serve society and its 
institutions.  It isn‟t.  It is an evil thing‟ (Macmurray, cited in Hale, 2002: 197 - 
emphasis added by Hale).  This view is not, as it may appear, anti-community, 
but rejects a politics of obligation.  „Responsibility‟ is a precondition of freedom 
that people will grasp enthusiastically in their own time, given the opportunity.  
It cannot be imposed (2002: 195).  This conception of community, says Hale, 
is the diametric opposite of New Labour‟s – it is about freedom to associate, 
not personal responsibility.   
 
As discussed above, capitalism was sometimes seen by Idealists as the best 
of all possible economic systems (Carter, 2003: 48-9).  However, in this 
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vision, the individual capitalist would see business as a form of national 
service, providing goods to benefit the community.  In doing so, she would 
pay the greatest regard to the welfare of the worker and wealth would be 
distributed so as to serve the common good.  Carter points out that Green 
was critical of selfish egoism and „animal appetite‟ (2003: 47).   
 
So, when Blair says in a BBC interview with Jeremy Paxman that „it's not a 
burning ambition for me to make sure that David Beckham earns less money‟, 
that would surely be an affront to Green‟s view of the common good, as these 
millions are (in Idealist terms) procured in shallow culture and disbursed in 
preening decadence.   
 
Giddens does acknowledge a problem of voluntary exclusion at the top of 
society, a „revolt of the elites‟ who live in „ghettos of the privileged‟ (2001: 53) 
and withdraw from public education and health (1998: 103).  He accuses the 
wealthy of abrogating their social and economic responsibilities, arguing that 
they, as well as the poor, must exercise responsibility (2001: 105).  A „social 
contract of mutual obligation … must stretch from bottom to top‟ and „avoiding 
taxes, or pulling out all the stops to pay as little tax as possible, are … 
evasions of civic duty‟ (2001: 119).   
 
This approach is interesting from the standpoint of Idealism, for it demands 
the enforcement of civic obligations among all in society – against the 
voluntarist principles in Idealist philosophy.  But Giddens then makes clear in 
his policy recommendations that, apart from tax evasion, buy in is to be 
 21 
voluntary, enticed with quality public services.  It is exactly this approach to 
social inclusion that drives New Labour attitude to the rich – the contract of 
mutual obligation that Giddens talks about is missing.  Arguably, it is deeply 
problematic from the standpoint of justice.  The strategy appears to violate 
procedural justice as it imposes milder forms of obligation on the rich than on 
the poor.   
 
Instead of an epistemological unity of individual and community toward a 
common good, it seems that the government is attempting an unstable mix of 
permissive individualism and voluntary commitment to community at one end 
of the social spectrum with moral authoritarianism and obligation to 
community at the other.  As such it may be more a recipe for social conflict 
than social cohesion.  This analysis suggests that it has yet to yet to find a 
sustainable one-nation politics, a common good or common principle of 
justice that can sustain community and solidarity in the conditions premised 
by the global free market economy.  I now turn to examine the obligations the 
State takes on to furnish equal opportunity structures in which the active, 
inclusive society can thrive.   
 
Social Inclusion as Equality of Opportunity 
Giddens argues of „old‟ Labour that the pursuit of social justice was often 
conflated, wrongly, with „equality of outcome‟ thereby ignoring the value of 
personal effort and responsibility (2001: 6).   Instead, he argues, the „Third 
Way‟ 
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seeks to foster a diversified society based upon egalitarian principles.  
Social diversity is not compatible with a strongly defined egalitarianism 
of outcome.  Third way politics looks instead to maximize equality of 
opportunity (2001: 53).  
 
Hence, while equality of opportunity is important, income inequality is 
tolerated, if not encouraged.  In developing a focus on equality of opportunity, 
Giddens invokes Sen (1999) to argue that endowments in the broad capability 
set are better than simple measures of income inequality. For Sen, capability 
enhancement is about ensuring that people are endowed with a wide range of 
capacities to enable them to live lives that they have reason to value.  These 
capacities depend on access to goods including health, education, income, 
security and political participation.  In Giddens‟ (2001: 130) understanding of 
Sen, disadvantage is defined as capability failure: not only the loss of material 
resources, but also the loss of freedom to achieve (2001: 87/88).  Like Sen, 
Giddens says that redistribution must not disappear from the agenda, but the 
emphasis must shift toward equality of opportunity.  How is this goal to be 
realised?  The following paragraphs outline four elements in the government‟s 
strategy for equality of opportunity: human capital, public service reform, 
democratic renewal and economic management.   
 
Building Human Capital  
In Giddens‟ view the post-war welfare state generated a culture of 
dependency.  Pace Etzioni, this problem is interpreted as an imbalance 
between the goods of right and responsibility, risk and security.  Now that 
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capitalism has achieved global hegemony, he reasons, society must embrace 
and nurture the entrepreneurial spirit. Giddens argues that the traditional 
welfare state was motivated to protect and care, but that it did not accord 
enough space for individual responsibility, an element without which 
entrepreneurialism cannot thrive (1998: 112-3).  State hand-outs have led, he 
argues, to problems of „dependency, moral hazard, bureaucracy, interest-
group formation and fraud‟ (2001: 33) – the MUD mentality. The role of 
government, then, is to encourage personal responsibility.  It must invest in 
human capital to re-invigorate Britain‟s traditional work-shop mentality (1998: 
99).  To this end, welfare must be made functional to responsible risk taking.  
Welfare benefits, particularly for younger people, are now conditional upon the 
person undertaking an active search for work and, if inadequately skilled, she 
must undertake education and training to become „employable‟ – the SID 
strategy.   It is argued that developing human capital improves access to 
work, vital for economic inclusion.   Harriet Harman observes: 
 
Work is central to the Government‟s attack on social exclusion.  Work 
is the only route to sustained financial independence.  But it is also 
much more.  Work is not must about earning a living.  It is a way of life 
(cited in Fairclough, 2000: 57).   
 
The role of the state is to guarantee opportunities in the Labour market 
through prudent economic management and to ensure that appropriate 
education and training is available.  New Labour‟s flagship regeneration 
 24 
programme, New Deal for Communities (NDC) is one means by which this 
policy is carried out in the locality. 
 
NDC was established in 39 neighbourhoods during 1999 and 2000, each 
getting some £50 million over a 10-year period.  NDC neighbourhoods fall 
within the worst 10% in the Index of Local Deprivation (DETR, 1998), 
compiled around the Government‟s main indicators of social exclusion: jobs, 
crime, health, education and housing.  The goal of NDC is to raise indices in 
these areas to local citywide averages and to the level of national „floor 
targets‟ set by government – for example „by 2004 to reduce school truancies 
by 10% compared to 2002, and sustain the new lower level, and improve 
overall attendance levels thereafter‟ (www.neighbourhood.gov.uk).  The goals 
of the programme are to create social inclusion in the following ways: building 
human and social capital, re-developing the local physical and economic 
infrastructure, improving the delivery of public services and mobilising local 
residents in the governance of their neighbourhoods.  It is therefore a test of 
New Labour‟s approach to community regeneration and social inclusion at the 
neighbourhood scale.   
 
In deprived neighbourhoods, educational attainment at GCSE level often falls 
well below regional and national averages.  Children in these areas can live in 
homes where educational aspiration is not (cannot be?) encouraged; they see 
no fruitful purpose to education and do not expect to live lives that they have 
reason to value.  Their life chances are curtailed at an early age.  A typical 
education or human capital project within an NDC area then seeks to raise 
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self-esteem and aspiration, especially among young children whose 
experiences have been found to determine success in later life.  Local 
business leaders are asked to advise schools about their labour needs and 
parents encouraged to support their children in learning.  Employability 
projects address the needs of adults with poor literacy and numeracy, improve 
employability skills and build relevant vocational skills to help people onto the 
first rung of employment (Hanson, 2003).   
 
A number of NDC areas have set up „job brokerage‟ projects as part of the 
programme‟s „worklessness‟ (unemployment) theme.  Job brokerage works 
on the principle that an intermediary service can make the labour market work 
better by bringing employers and employees together.  It aims to overcome 
„barriers‟ to work by providing a link to the labour market through information 
about available jobs through intermediaries who work on behalf of clients and 
employers.  The mediator helps each person improve her ability to carry out 
her job and sustain employment by identifying suitable opportunities for re-
training (Walton et al, 2003).  However, the government‟s human capital 
strategy faces a number of philosophical and empirical challenges.   
 
Controversy 5: Human Capital – Inclusionary or Exclusionary?  
It is far from self-evident that a human capital strategy is instrumental for 
social inclusion.  One question is whether more educated people engender 
more good jobs, as against the zero sum game of re-distributing work to high-
skill areas.  Mason‟s study of skill utilisation in UK graduate employment 
(2002) suggests that graduate substitution for non-graduate employees in the 
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service sector has led to a one-off up-skilling of jobs in some departments, 
such as marketing.  Nonetheless, 34% of graduates were over-qualified for 
their jobs in 2001 (2002: 452).  Says Mason, over-educated graduates now 
represent a substantially larger proportion of the workforce than before the 
transition in the 1980s and 1990s to mass higher-education.   This situation is 
leading to polarized career prospects across the graduate labour market.  
Changing this pattern depends on government and employers gearing 
themselves toward „skill-intensive high value-added production or service 
strategies‟ (Mason, 2002: 454/5).  This political economy of skill is, suggest 
Lloyd and Payne (2002), improbable.  For Coates and Hay (2001: 466), the 
UK economy is locked into economic trajectory that consolidates a low-wage 
niche for UK manufacturing in an increasingly competitive global economy. 
And, as Davies puts it, „an educated reserve army of labor is likely to have 
little stake in the political and economic system‟ (2004b: 29).   
 
A second objection to human capital strategies, at least as practiced by New 
Labour, is that they reduce human beings to commodities.  This pertains to 
the question of whether education should be geared solely to labour market 
needs, or whether it is a good in its own right.  Beck argues that New Labour 
reforms take the former path, representing an „insidious process of take-over, 
in which any significantly independent set of educational values may be 
increasingly at risk‟ (Beck, 1999: 224).  In this view, education is not a means 
to self-realization; the human being is instead an instrument of economic 
competitiveness – the polar opposite view to Macmurray and the British 
Idealists.   
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Modernising Public Services  
The second dimension in the government‟s policy repertoire is equality of 
access to public services, particularly those it deems crucial to social inclusion 
– such as education and health care.  The „modernisation‟ agenda seeks to 
achieve two things for social inclusion: raising the standard of public services 
to encourage „opt-in‟ by those wealthy enough to pay for private provision; 
and eliminating „post-code lotteries‟ where public services are of uneven 
quality and/or availability - typically in deprived areas (Giddens, 2001: 120).   
 
This strategy involves a range of interventions.  One approach is selective 
investment in deprived neighbourhoods through programmes like NDC - 
relatively generous public investment in a small number of communities, seen 
to have been abandoned by previous Conservative governments.   
 
A second approach is the idea of „joined up‟ government.   Historically, UK 
government has been characterised by „departmentalism‟ – the tendency of 
government departments to work at cross-purposes or to duplicate effort 
(Parkinson and Wilks, 1986).  Despite the best efforts of successive 
governments to create inter-departmental synergies and economies of scale 
„departmentalism‟ has persisted.  At the citywide scale, Local Strategic 
Partnerships have been established to institutionalise a collaborative dynamic, 
not only between public service providers, but also between public, private, 
community and voluntary sectors.   
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The objective of LSPs is to bring local „stakeholders‟ together to hammer out a 
„community strategy‟, which typically sets the strategic goals for an area over 
5-10 years, listing key priorities and identifying those responsible for action 
(Johnson and Osborne, 2003).   This approach is partly to do with unifying 
diverse actors under a common strategy aligned with the Government‟s „one 
nation‟ project.  But perhaps the most important purpose of the LSP is to 
achieve public accountability through „mainstreaming‟.  If the community 
strategy is indeed representative of the common priorities of the local polity, 
then it is incumbent on agency partners to deliver certain parts of it.  For 
example, in an ideal-typical LSP, an agency, such as the local Primary Care 
Trust (Health Authority), uses the community strategy to inform resource 
planning, aligning its activities, where they differ, with the goals of the 
partnership.  It clarifies areas of responsibility to avoid duplication and looks to 
contribute to other dimensions of the strategy where possible (for example 
providing employment opportunities to local people) thereby maximising 
joined-up working and resource synergy.  It is a conduit for the diffusion of 
„good practice‟ and community representatives challenge service providers 
when falling short of their obligations under the community strategy – for 
example if refuse services are poor in a particular area, or where innovations 
in service delivery in one area can be rolled out in others.  The LSP is 
therefore a crucial instrument in the modernisation, synchronisation and re-
organisation of public services at the local scale and by extension for social 
inclusion.  It seeks to eliminate nugatory effort between public agencies 
bringing efficiency gains and to create an environment in which public service 
providers are accountable to the community voice.   
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NDC serves a similar purpose.  The fact that this programme has been made 
available in 39 neighbourhoods only (out of 8414 wards in England) indicates 
that the priority for addressing neighbourhood deprivation is not large scale 
resource injections into deprived areas, but rather the dissemination of good 
practice in the „mainstream‟.  NDC is an experiment, searching for innovation 
in regeneration and community governance for wider implementation.  LSPs 
are an important mechanism for the diffusion of good ideas.   
 
A third approach is the introduction of „choice‟ into the public domain – the 
belief that public services will improve if, for example, patients are able to 
choose where to have treatment and hospitals have to compete for business 
in a system where funds follow the patient.   The Foundation Trust scheme is 
an extension of this idea, where „high-performing‟ hospitals are freed from 
certain government controls and run by a public interest company on which sit 
members of the public and relevant stakeholders. While only a small number 
of residents may be on the Board, the wider public are invited to become 
members of the Trust and participate in Board elections.  Having the freedom 
to borrow capital and compete for users, foundation hospitals are structured to 
innovate in order to compete for business – a solution inspired by capitalist 
markets (DoH, 2003).  If choice leads to improved services stimulated through 
competition, then it is instrumental to social inclusion.  This element of the 
strategy for public sector reform has been subject to particularly trenchant 
criticism. 
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Controversy 6: Marketisation in the Public Sector – Fuelling Inequality? 
There has been a political backlash against the idea that creating forms of 
competition within the public sector will improve efficiency.  Rather, it is 
argued, it will lead to „two-tier‟ services and greater inequality.  First, it is 
argued, freed to some extent from state control (if not from government 
targets), foundation hospitals will be able to break national bargaining 
arrangements and negotiate or impose pay scales and conditions of service, 
leading to inequalities and distortions in the allocation of trained staff and the 
provision of quality healthcare services.  Second, it is argued that some 
hospitals could lose up to 30 percent of their revenues.  Competition will mean 
a good service for some in the more privileged areas and healthcare deserts 
in others as hospitals are reduced to providing a very limited and shabby 
service. It is feared that a two tier service is the necessary outcome of 
competition for custom (Prentis, 2003).   
 
Foundation hospitals are relatively new, but the case of education provides a 
long-standing example of the way marketisation can fuel inequality in the 
public sector.   In a study of the new management and governance of 
education, Ranson et al (1999) show how it can reinforce privileged interests 
against those of the public.   They argue that if a selective school were to 
agree with the local community that it should recruit more ethnic minority 
students, it would be difficult to carry out this decision, given the ability of 
(racist, white middle-class?) parents to move their children to other schools.   
Thus, market „choice‟ can have the effect of undermining confidence in 
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community agreements because it renders them unsustainable.  It gives „exit‟ 
options to some individuals, but undermines the wider community network.   
 
The market as a result places collective welfare beyond the reach of 
public deliberation, choice and action: in other words, democracy‟ 
(Ranson et al, 1999: 105).   
 
Unsurprisingly, find Ranson et al, it is poorer families which lose out to the 
privileged families who exercise this „exit‟ option.  They argue (1999: 106) that 
the market in education  
 
entrenches the powerful beyond control.   The doctrine of marketisation 
colludes in promoting the agency and choice of the public while 
actually extinguishing it.   
 
Marketisation can therefore undermine confidence in local agreements and 
networks, re-enforcing social hierarchies and social exclusion.  This outcome 
is defensible on grounds of freedom of choice, but not social justice.   
 
Labour‟s use of markets in public service delivery is premised on a „what 
works‟ view of the world – it does not matter to the public who delivers 
services provided they work properly.  Yet, if critics are right, the problem with 
marketisation as a means to improve public services is not one of taste.  It is 
about the constitutive inability of market to guarantee public services on an 
equitable basis (see also controversies 1 and 8).  Policy makers, particularly 
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those to the left of the government, are then faced with the problem of 
developing public choice and accountability (where they are feasible and 
desirable) without recourse to market mechanisms.   
 
Democratic Renewal  
The idea of community holding agencies to account in institutions like LSPs 
points to a third dimension in the government‟s approach to social exclusion – 
public participation and democratic renewal.  The strategy for „active 
citizenship‟ discussed above explains the rationale for democratic renewal – 
but what of the policy interventions designed to achieve it?  The 
Government‟s view is that re-invigorated local governance is vital, if it is to 
deliver its pledges on the ground, where it matters (Chandler, 2000: 4).  
 
The government‟s strategy for democratic renewal focuses on remedying 
exclusion through the recognition of diversity and difference, engaging 
tenants, residents, the community sector and the voluntary sector in new 
democratic structures.  It also seeks to engage black and ethnic minority 
groups, who are more likely not to vote and are under-represented in the 
political class (Perrons and Skyer, 2003).  The Government has introduced a 
range of methods to extend democracy and give the citizen, in all her 
diversity, a greater say.  Methods include: electoral reform (postal voting and 
other ways of making voting easier), surveys, polls, websites, citizen panels, 
co-opting to scrutiny panels, question/answer sessions, consultation 
documents, public meetings, citizen juries, focus groups, visioning exercises, 
service user forums, issue forums, shared interest forums, 
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area/neighbourhood forums and user management of services (Chandler, 
2000: 10).  In addition, local government has been required to strengthen 
political leadership, visibility in the community and accountability – for 
example through the appointment of leader-cabinet models, or elected 
Mayors.  
 
Local governance through partnerships is also instrumental to democratic 
renewal.  Whereas in the Major years, emphasis fell on building collaboration 
between local authority, business and later other statutory actors (Davies, 
2002), under New Labour they have been much more inclusive of voluntary 
and community interests.  The engagement of resident communities within 
partnerships is at the same time seen as constitutive of their political freedom, 
instrumental to social inclusion and instrumental to efficiency in service 
delivery, as statutory partners can respond better to local needs and demands 
(Goss, 2001).  Partnership serves the government‟s communitarian 
endeavour in that it aims to promote a consensual and participative ethos 
capable of binding diverse stakeholders together.  It provides an institutional 
architecture in which „community‟ can be forged within the parameters of a 
free market political economy.   
 
Again, NDC is a good example at the urban scale.  One of the conditions for 
NDC funding was that each local programme should be delivered through a 
multi-agency partnership, in which local residents were to play a leading role 
(DETR, 1999).  A typical partnership has an elected Board, on which local 
residents frequently form a majority, and a variety of other structures, 
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including sub-boards with delegated powers, neighbourhood community 
forums and theme-based working groups (around issues such as crime, jobs, 
health, housing and education) in which community activists, programme 
managers and agency professionals develop projects to be funded by NDC in 
accordance with the strategic direction set by the Board.  This sophisticated 
institutional architecture is designed to ensure both that local communities 
have a say about programme expenditure and that there is some 
accountability to government for executive decisions made by the Board and 
the professional staff managing the programme.  However, the idea of 
partnership as an inclusive, consensual form of governance is proving difficult 
to deliver.   
 
Controversy 7: Local Governance in Partnerships – Consensus or Conflict? 
New Labour‟s political style is, as Fairclough argues, consensual and the 
institutional framework for partnership is designed as if sustainable, inclusive 
consensus can be reached.  But, what if partnerships do not work and conflict 
trumps consensus?  Recent literature on urban regeneration and partnerships 
highlights the fact that establishing consensual institutions can be 
problematic.  For example, Painter and Clarence (2001: 1222-3) detect a 
competitive dynamic within partnerships, while Pierre and Stoker note that it is 
not certain whether actors can, or wish to „behave in tune with a governance 
„mission statement‟ and governing style‟ (2002: 43).  They suggest that UK 
governing institutions are in a state of flux, with several outcomes possible 
(2002: 44).  Lowndes and Wilson (2003: 275) argue that the values informing 
the institutional redesign of local government have become less clear and 
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more contested.  One reason for this might be that the list of priorities 
habitually adopted in community strategies sometimes come into conflict with 
one another.  For example, does the goal of economic growth necessarily 
complement that of a healthy environment?  Another reason may be that 
partnerships have come to be more a control strategy than a means for 
articulating the community voice.    
 
Several empirical studies of NDC find conflict between stakeholders about the 
local political agenda, as well as tensions between local partnerships and 
higher tiers of government (ie both horizontal and vertical tensions) (Dargan, 
2002; Perrons and Skyer, 2003).  Arguably, citizenship promoted through 
these institutions is conditional on broad acceptance, conscious or otherwise, 
of the rules (formal and informal) deriving from New Labour‟s political 
economy.  The governance structures of NDC have become very complex, 
attempting to balance accountability to government for programme delivery 
with local democracy and community ownership.  They are designed to 
respond to rigorous programme audit by regional government offices and, on 
occasion, directly by Ministers working to a value for money and 
accountability to government principle.  These rules and structures respond to 
professional and political perceptions of good regeneration practice and, it 
may be argued, are inherently exclusionary of residents, whatever remedial 
measures may be taken in the form of „training‟ to compensate such 
disadvantage.  
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NDCs are also expected to work in partnership with other agencies and 
regeneration programmes in the wider geographical area to maximise 
leverage and ensure that examples of good practice are „mainstreamed‟ by 
the statutory agencies.  Consequently, NDCs represent not only a capital 
injection but also a way of driving the modernisation of public services.  This 
goal itself generates constraints on community control, at least where 
aspirations are not in perfect harmony with those of government.  Since the 
programme is not intended to be divorced from the wider governance of the 
city and the agencies and initiatives working within it, it means that while local 
innovation is encouraged, it has to be complement the government‟s urban 
policy paradigm –market led regeneration and human capital development.  
For example, in one case known to the author, residents who attempted to 
bring forward a project falling outside this paradigm - building and subsidising 
a sports centre - were rebuffed on value for money and economic 
sustainability grounds.   
 
Constraints of this sort have had negative consequences for local consensus.  
Perrons and Skyer find relations in Shoreditch NDC characterised by 
resentment.  They argue that centrally imposed performance management 
requirements, including pressure to spend and deliver, render „the task of 
adequately representing the community difficult – “virtually impossible”‟ (2003: 
278).  But this situation has not been passively accepted by residents.  It has 
created „enormous anger and resentment‟ (2003: 279).   
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Although conflict in NDCs is by no means universal and where it does occur, it 
is relatively low key at worst manifesting in bitter arguments, it has in some 
cases undermined the ability of partnerships to function and there is evidence 
that central government has rolled back its commitment to community 
leadership in NDC as a consequence (Davies, forthcoming 2005).   
 
Conflict, even micro-conflict over trivial matters may seriously undermine 
inclusive, consensual networks (Davies, forthcoming 2006).  Kjaer (2004: 
199), for example points out that the democratic state was designed to 
contain conflict, whereas partnership networks were not.  In the ideal-typical 
partnership or network model, there is no clear means of meditation or 
arbitration between competing priorities and no central decision making 
authority.  Where networks lack reciprocity and trust, there is no internal 
mechanism to hold them together.  Relatively minor conflicts may then 
destabilize them.  The temptation as with NDC is for government to intervene 
to maintain acceptable levels of programme delivery, thereby undermining its 
own strategy for local democratic inclusion (Davies, forthcoming 2006).  The 
challenge for policy makers and scholars who support the idea of inclusive 
partnership working is to design institutions that can deal with the reality of 
conflict without suppressing debate, falling apart or becoming grid-locked 
(Clohesy, 2002).   
 
Economic Management and Income Redistribution  
The final tool in the government repertoire for promoting social inclusion is its 
economic strategy for alleviating poverty.  Whether the Government has 
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effected a redistribution of wealth is both complex and controversial (see 
controversy 3).  However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, is 
widely credited with achieving a degree of „redistribution by stealth‟ through 
fiscal measures to enhance the income position of the poorest.  Brown, 
famously following „post neo-classical endogenous growth theory‟, believes 
that social inclusion is itself instrumental to economic growth.  Therefore, 
measures to raise the skill levels of the population can raise productivity and 
GDP.  However, the main premise of this theory is that the economic cycle, 
the pendulum swing in capitalist economies between boom and slump, can be 
stabilised by adjusting supply within the economy, improving productivity and 
efficiency and re-deploying resources to increasingly valuable purposes (eg 
within the knowledge economy) thereby creating endogenous impetus in the 
economy (Dolowitz, 2004).  Arguably, it is on the success of this strategy that 
the whole social inclusion strategy depends.  For without sustainable 
economic growth from which all can derive opportunity, the idea of a 
consensual polity united by one-nation politics and common priorities loses a 
central support mechanism.  Thus far, it may be argued, Brown‟s strategy has 
succeeded in a favourable economic environment in that Britain has avoided 
a severe recession of the kind witnessed in the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
With respect to economic inclusion, Brown has introduced a range of tax and 
benefit changes designed to boost low-income households.  They include the 
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) for low-income families in work, and 
various increases to means-tested benefits for pensioners and families with 
children.  Such tax changes have been largely progressive, leading to a 12% 
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gain for the poorest decile by 2001 with progressively smaller gains 
throughout the remaining deciles (Clark et al, 2001).   Predictably, however, 
there is wide disagreement about the Chancellor‟s successes, particularly his 
ability to maintain economic stability or reduce inequalities through his subtle 
redistribution strategy.   
 
Controversy 8: Same Old Malaise: Low Productivity and High Inequality 
As we have seen, the whole government strategy depends to a large extent 
on whether Labour has succeeded in taming the economic cycle, or whether 
as Callinicos argues in the third way, this idea is a conceit.  Callinicos accuses 
Brown of failing to acknowledge the constitutive instability of capitalist 
economies.  Thus, he claims, Brown has exceeded the ambitions of all 
previous chancellors and „[h]istory is likely to have some surprises for him up 
its sleeve‟ (2001: 55).   
 
Whether or not Callinicos is right about this, there are signs that low 
productivity, part of the traditional British economic malaise, remains 
intractable.  Last year the Independent newspaper published figures that 
showed no relative improvement in UK investment and productivity despite 
two decades of liberalization and de-regulation.  The Working in Britain 
Survey (Work Foundation, 2003) showed that employees in competitor 
nations are some 30% more productive than the UK worker.  What alternative 
policies might address this gap?   
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Hay (1999) argues for reform of the financial architecture of the British 
economy to provide ready investment capital to industry.  He argues for 
regional investment banks and mechanisms to encourage long term decisions 
by big investors like pension funds.   He anticipates a partnership between 
government and industrial capital to overcome what he sees as dominance 
and short-termism in the financial sector.   Coates (2001), however, dismisses 
this strategy for „progressive competitiveness‟ as impractical.  He argues that 
industrial capital tends to want the same deregulating policies as finance.  It is 
not only capital that moves around the globe, he points out, industry does too. 
So, for Coates, the idea that business can be recruited to a progressive 
strategy for long term investment in the British economy flies in the face of the 
evidence.  Whether financial, or industrial, capital is always looking for the 
quick buck and European countries using this model have not proved 
invulnerable to the pressures for retrenchment faced in the UK during the 
1980s.    
 
But what impact has Brown‟s tax and benefit reform strategy had on 
inequality?  According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Goodman and 
Oldfield, 2004: vii) the Gini coefficient measuring income inequality has fallen 
slightly from its peak in 2000-2001, but not by significant amounts.  The Gini 
coefficient rose dramatically in the 1980s under Thatcher and fell under Major, 
whereas it has risen again under Blair (Shephard, 2003: 4).  For the IFS, 
income inequality in 2002/03 was „significantly higher‟ than in 1996/97 
(Goodman and Oldfield, 2004: 37).  It remains higher than at any point in the 
1980s (2004: 10), and at its highest since the 1950s (2004: 19-20).   
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In terms of real income growth, the IFS finds that gains are relatively evenly 
distributed under New Labour between 1997 and 2002, with the bottom 40% 
gaining slightly more than the top 20%.  Interestingly, however, while the 
poorest 20% gained much less than the other four quintiles under Margaret 
Thatcher, under the Major government, the gains for the poorest 20% were 
proportionally greater than under Blair – although the actual percentage 
income gain in each quintile was lower because of lower economic growth 
(Shephard, 2003: 2-3).   
 
However, detailed percentile figures for average annual income gain between 
1996/7-2002/3 show that from the 1st to the 15th percentiles, annual income 
growth was markedly slower than for the rest of the population.  In fact, for 
individuals below the 15th percentile point, income growth is progressively 
lower the poorer the individual and for the 1st percentile point, growth is 
negative at -1.5%.  Growth for the 99th percentile is 1% higher than for all 
other percentiles (Brewer et al, 2004: 18).     
 
Comparatively, between 1996 and 2001 Britain moved from 6th to 4th most 
unequal in the European Union, passing Ireland and Italy.  By 2001, Britain 
was less unequal than only Spain, Greece and Portugal in the EU (Brewer et 
al, 2004: 16).  However, it improved its position from most unequal to fourth 
most unequal in child poverty, where the IFS finds that it is on course to meet 
the government‟s target of reducing relative child poverty by 25% by 2004-5 
(2004: 62).   
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Overall, the IFS finds that since the mid-1990s, Britain has experienced a 
combination of slightly rising income inequality and falling relative poverty, 
caused by two trends.  Falling relative poverty is explained by the fact that 
over the majority of the distribution (ie the 2nd to 9th deciles), income growth 
has been slightly stronger amongst poorer individuals than those located 
further up the income scale.  Rising income inequality is explained by the fact 
that in the richest and poorest decile groups the pattern is reversed – the 
richest 10% have gained more than the poorest 10%, which presents as rising 
inequality on the Gini coefficient.  Perhaps the most interesting IFS finding is 
that New Labour‟s tax and benefit policy has „kept the lid on what would 
otherwise have been a much bigger growth in inequality‟ on account of 
underlying trends in the economy (Brewer et al, 2004: 62).  
 
As discussed above, income inequality does not appear to matter very much 
to New Labour and Brown may be satisfied by maintaining it at current levels 
and reducing poverty for children – although these goals may prove difficult to 
achieve and maintain if the IFS if right about underlying trends.  Of greater 
concern for Gordon Brown may be the seemingly intractable productivity 
problem and its centrality for competitiveness.  The question is what further 
measures might enhance productivity, without exacerbating inequalities? 
 
Conclusion  
To summarise, New Labour has an ambitious and sophisticated strategy for 
social justice/inclusion.  This is embedded in a liberal political economy, the 
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perceived pre-condition for national prosperity in the era of capitalist 
globalisation, and overlaid by an ethical communitarianism characterised by a 
politics of obligation - present in its conception of citizenship.  
  
What does this vision of social inclusion add up to?  Gray (2000) finds that it 
has little or nothing to do with traditional left wing concerns with „equality‟.  He 
defines „social inclusion‟ as „common membership‟, the idea that „no one is 
denied access to activities and practices that are central in the life of society.  
An inclusionary society is a cohesive society‟ (2000: 23).  Thus, encouraging 
middle class opt-in to public services may be desirable in creating social 
cohesion, but policy measures to promote it, such as selective schools, are 
anti-egalitarian and violate social democratic beliefs about justice (Gray, 2000: 
29).  This idea of „common membership‟ may better describe New Labour‟s 
approach than „equality of opportunity‟, given the goods at stake.    
 
However, club membership is not free.  It is governed by rules underpinned by 
a comprehensive vision of the political good: personal entrepreneurialism and 
ethical communitarianism.  Following these principles, „social inclusion‟ is 
primarily not about greater redistribution, but measures that allow, and indeed 
force, Thatcher‟s lost generation to participate in the social „mainstream‟ and 
in community life.  This approach is a contract, in which the individual pledges 
to take responsibility across the full spectrum of social life – from maintaining 
employability to maintaining a healthy life style.  The state is then re-shaped 
to bear part of the risk that such responsible individuals face, but in ways that 
minimise dependency and the social wage.   
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Unsurprisingly, this world view and its representation in public policy, has 
been subject to trenchant criticism from a wide range of perspectives, both left 
and right.  Does it make sense to talk about remedies for social exclusion, 
when it is constantly re-produced in market competition (Byrne, 1999)?  If 
social exclusion is a valid idea, why label one person/group and not another 
(Cox, 1995)?  Is social exclusion necessarily a bad thing?  Should we be 
concerned with social justice at all?  Is it possible to square individual with 
community, particularly when the demands on individual and community 
made by the government seem incompatible? At the policy level, it is 
questionable whether human capital development is working.  It is also 
debatable whether Brown‟s careful economic management is delivering 
sustainable economic growth, or whether his mildly re-distributive measures 
are doing more than plug the dam of rising inequality.  Indeed, could it be 
otherwise in a capitalist economy and does it matter if not?  Is „choice‟ in 
public services merely reproducing inequality in new arenas?  And, are local 
partnership approaches like LSPs and NDC building in problems at the outset 
by assuming that consensus can be reached among diverse groups with 
diverse life experiences?  If not top-down state intervention, then what 
mechanisms can mediate intractable conflicts, be they major or minor, and on 
whose terms?  It is with these continuing questions that a third-term Labour 
government led by Blair or Brown will have to grapple.   
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